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Abstract 
 
In this paper I give an account of development debates of the past two decades, 
focusing on the Washington Consensus and on the broader economic development 
discourse in historical context. Section 2 gives a basic account of the Washington 
consensus and how its meaning changed from the original formulation. Section 3 presents 
the evolution of the economic development discourse since the second-world-war, through 
the 1980s, up to the present. Section 4 asks if there is now a new consensus on economic 
development, in light of the recent report of the Commission on Growth and Development. 
Section 5 concludes.  
                                                 
* Cornell University: T.H. Lee Professor of World Affairs, International Professor of Applied Economics and 
Management, and Professor of Economics. Paper prepared for the 2008 Macalester International Round 
Table, Macalester College, St. Paul, Minnesota, October 2-4, 2008.  I am grateful to my fellow panelists, 
James Scott (Yale) and Michael Watts (Berkeley), to Ahmed Samatar (Macalester), and to the round table 
participants for helpful comments and discussion. 
1. Introduction 
 
The 1980s were a hell of a decade. They began with the reverberations of the 
second OPEC oil shock. They ended with the fall of the Berlin wall. In between, we had 
the Reagan-Thatcher-Kohl economic policy era in North America and Europe, the Volcker 
interest rate shock, the Latin American debt crisis, collapse in Africa, the start of rapid 
growth in China and in India, and on and on. Oh, and by the way, in 1989 John Williamson 
coined the term “Washington Consensus.”1  
 
The intellectual history of this term over the past two decades is intimately tied in 
with the economic history of this period, just as its origins were tied to the economic 
history of the 1980s. But the term and its meanings have also interacted with a broader 
discourse on economic development—in particular, how government policies and 
interventions can help or harm development. In fact, the Washington Consensus, the 
development discourse, and actual economic policy and outcomes, have all co-evolved 
over the past twenty years, each influencing and being influenced by the others. The 1990s 
and 2000s have been no less interesting and eventful than the 1980s, including: an 
acceleration in global integration in trade and financial flows, “shock therapy” in the 
formerly communist countries, the East Asian financial crisis, rapid growth in a number of 
Asian countries and spectacular growth in China with perhaps the most dramatic reduction 
in income poverty in history, sharp increases in inequality in rapidly growing countries, and 
so on. 
 
In this paper I give an account of the development debates of the past two decades, 
focusing on the Washington Consensus and on the broader economic development 
discourse in the historical context.  Section 2 gives a basic account of the Washington 
consensus and how its meaning changed from the original formulation. Section 3 presents 
the evolution of the economic development discourse since the second-world-war, through 
the 1980s, up to the present. Section 4 asks if there is now a new consensus on economic 
development in light of the recent report of the Commission on Growth and Development. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
My focus in this paper is primarily on the economic, and relates naturally to my 
own academic writings and my own policy experience. In this sense the account will be 
somewhat idiosyncratic. But I hope that it will provide sufficient food for wider thought 
and debate. 
                                                 
1 Williamson (1990). 
 2
2. The Washington Consensus—Mutation of Meanings 
 
The best account of how the “Washington Consensus” was coined and formulated 
is given by John Williamson himself (Williamson, 2003). It is quoted in full in Box 1, so 
we are on the same page with the original content as envisaged by the author. 
 
Box 1 
 
The Origin of the Washington Consensus 
 
“The story of the Washington Consensus dates back to 1989, when the press in the United States 
was still talking about how Latin American countries were unwilling to undertake the reforms that might 
give them a chance to escape the debt crisis. It seemed to me that this was a misconception and that, in fact, 
a sea change in attitudes toward economic policy was occurring. To determine whether this was correct, the 
Institute for International Economics decided to convene a conference at which authors from 10 Latin 
American nations would present papers detailing what had been happening in their respective countries. To 
try to make sure that they all addressed a common set of questions, I wrote a background paper in which I 
listed 10 policy reforms that I argued almost everyone in Washington thought were needed in Latin 
America as of that date. I labeled this reform agenda the “Washington Consensus,” never dreaming that I 
was coining a term that would become a war cry in ideological debates for more than a decade. Indeed, I 
thought the ideas I was laying out were consensual, which is why I gave them the label I did. The 10 
reforms that constituted my list were as follows: 
Fiscal discipline. This was in the context of a region where almost all the countries had run large 
deficits that led to balance of payments crises and were experiencing high inflation that hit mainly the poor 
because the rich could park their money abroad.  
Reordering public expenditure priorities. This suggested switching expenditure, in a progrowth 
and propoor way, from things like nonmerit subsidies to basic health care, education, and infrastructure.  
Tax reform. The aim was a tax system that would combine a broad tax base with moderate 
marginal tax rates. 
Liberalization of interest rates. In retrospect, I wish I had formulated this more broadly as 
financial liberalization, stressed that views differed on how fast it should be achieved, and recognized the 
importance of accompanying financial liberalization with prudential supervision.  
A competitive exchange rate. I fear I indulged in wishful thinking in asserting that there was a 
consensus in favor of ensuring that the exchange rate would be competitive, which implies an intermediate 
regime; in fact, Washington was already beginning to edge toward the two-corner doctrine, which holds 
that a country must either fix firmly or float “cleanly.” 
Trade liberalization. I acknowledged that there was a difference of view about how fast trade 
should be liberalized, but everyone agreed that this was the appropriate direction in which to move. 
Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment. I specifically did not include comprehensive 
capital account liberalization because I did not believe that it commanded a consensus in Washington. 
Privatization. This was the one area in which what originated as a neoliberal idea won broad 
acceptance. We have since been made very conscious that it matters a lot how privatization is done: it can 
be a highly corrupt process that transfers assets to a privileged elite for a fraction of their true value, but the 
evidence is that privatization brings benefits (especially in terms of improved service) when done properly, 
and the privatized enterprise either sells into a competitive market or is properly regulated. 
Deregulation. This focused specifically on easing barriers to entry and exit, not on abolishing 
safety or environmental regulations (or regulations governing prices in a noncompetitive industry).  
Property rights. This was primarily about providing the informal sector with the ability to gain 
property rights at an acceptable cost (inspired by Hernando de Soto’s analysis).” 
Williamson (2003) 
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Although he writes that in 1989 he was reporting factually on what was the 
consensus among certain key constituencies, both in that original paper (Williamson, 
1990), and in the commentary above from Williamson (2003), there is a strong strain of 
what the policy reforms should be—the normative is quite closely tied to the positive. With 
this in mind, I think those who use the label Washington Consensus as interchangeable 
with “neo-liberal” or “market fundamentalist” would be and should be surprised to read the 
above account. For example, how many people know that “Reordering public expenditure 
priorities” to switch towards basic health care and education was number 2 in the original 
list of 10? Or that while liberalization of trade and foreign direct investment was on the list, 
capital account liberalization was not? Or that “Deregulation” did not include the abolition 
of safety or environmental regulations, or of regulation of prices in non-competitive 
industries? Other items of commentary, given above, or in Williamsons other writings2, 
also indicate that, at least in the mind of the originator, the Washington Consensus was not 
the same as, perhaps even nowhere near, a “neo-liberal” or “market fundamentalist” 
agenda.3 Clearly, something strange happened. 
 
What explains the evolution of the term from its meaning as originally coined, to 
representing one side of an ideological divide which structured much of the development 
discourse in the 1990s? In Kanbur (1999), commenting on Williamson (1999), I offered the 
following explanation, based on my operational experience within the World Bank:  
 
“It might be useful to start with the observation that the Washington Consensus became what it did, 
not what it said. For example, Williamson notes that "when I reviewed the progress Latin American countries 
had made implementing the recommended set of policies several years later, I concluded that the least 
progress had been made in implementing the second policy, redirecting public expenditure policies." Well, is 
it not then understandable that those in civil society who saw outcomes rather than read Williamson's original 
paper, would conclude that the Washington Consensus did not contain item number 2? The same is true of the 
other items, where those in developing countries might have seen positions espoused, by representatives of 
Washington institutions, which were not as nuanced as Williamson's original or more recent formulations.  
 
And here we come to what to me is the most important point. Mindset, and stance, are all important. 
There is no question in my mind that in the 1980s, and to a certain extent well into the 1990s, many saw the 
main task as being storming the citadel of statist development strategies. In this mindset, nuances were beside 
the point— intellectual curiosities which paled in comparison to the benefits of rapid and deep movements 
away from the former paradigm. And, moreover, Washington institutions were deeply suspicious of the real 
intentions of those they were dealing with. They suspected, perhaps rightly, that those on the other side were 
hell bent on preserving the status quo. In this setting, a negotiating stance, rather than a dialogue based on 
mutual comprehension, was appropriate. So the negotiators from Washington always took a more purist 
stance, a more extreme stance than even their own intellectual framework permitted (they were all surely well 
schooled in the theory of the second best). "Give them an inch of nuance, and they'll take a mile of status 
quo", seemed to be the mindset and the stance. "If you want 28 enterprises privatized, start by asking for 56", 
seemed to be the opening gambit. Is it any wonder then, that those on the other side came away with the 
impression that those from Washington had a consensus, and one which did not match Williamson's nuanced 
formulation?” 
                                                 
2 For example, Williamson (1999, 2002, 2004) 
3 Just one example, picked almost at random, will illustrate what I have in mind. In an entry on April 14, 
2008, Tony Karon’s “Rootless Cosmopolitan” blog provides commentary on rising food prices and concludes 
as follows: “The interesting thing, though, is that solving this particular crisis will require that the World Bank and IMF 
abandon the economic orthodoxy that they imposed globally during the 1990s — the “Washington consensus,” that 
frowns on things like government spending on feeding the poor.” One sees this use of the Washington Consensus al the 
time. 
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Still, all this is perhaps by the by. What matters is not so much the label but the 
content, and on that there is little disagreement. Development strategies, broadly construed, 
can be put on a spectrum, with less market orientation, less integration into the world 
economy, more regulation of economic activity, greater role for public provision of social 
services, more redistribution, etc., at one end; and the opposite at the other end. Neo-liberal 
might be one term to describe combinations towards the “right” of the spectrum. What term 
to use for the “left” end of the spectrum is not entirely clear—“progressive”, “liberal” (in 
the US sense), “statist”; each of these, or any other term, is liable to cause confusion. It is a 
measure of the difficulties of nomenclature that the unwieldy “non-neo-liberal” might be 
the least confusing appellation—at least in relation to the other end of the spectrum being 
labeled “neo-liberal.” Further, in recent years “globalizers” and “anti-globalizers” have also 
been used to describe the two ends of the spectrum, although technically speaking 
globalization should apply only to external dimensions of economic policy. I will use many 
different terms in this paper, but perhaps the “left” and “right” end of the spectrum is best 
descriptive of the linear representation adopted above, as well as suggestive of political 
orientation, but only suggestive of course. An important point, however, is that what we 
have in terms of policy space is a continuum—it is not a case of one or the other, but rather 
one of having a combination of policies whose center of gravity is closer to one end rather 
than the other. How have these combinations changed and shifted over the six decades 
since the second-world-war, including during the last two decades after the christening of 
the Washington consensus? 
 
 
3. The Economic Development Discourse Since the Second World War4
 
The sixty years since the end of the second-world-war have seen cycles of 
consensus among the economic policy making elite. The center of gravity of where to 
locate economic policies along the non-neo-liberal to neo-liberal continuum, from “left” to 
“right”, and in what combinations, has moved first one way and then another. It is worth 
reprising this history, to better locate the emergence of the Washington Consensus in its 
era, and its evolution since then. 
 
The quarter century after the second-world-war saw the peak of the inward-
oriented, state-oriented development paradigm driven by an acceptance of the 
pervasiveness of market failures (or non-existence of many markets) in developing 
countries. Export pessimism was the rationale for import-substitution strategies. The 
perceived success of Keynesian policies in restoring full employment in the industrialized 
west after prolonged high unemployment in the 1930s, and of the Soviet Union in 
transforming itself from an agrarian nation at the time of the communist revolution to an 
industrial power in the 1930s, 40s and 50s, was the spur to setting up of the Indian Five 
Year Plans, with their objectives of aggregate demand management and heavy investment 
                                                 
4 Some of this section is based on Kanbur (2004) 
 5
in state industries behind walls of tariff protection.5 The newly independent countries in 
Africa followed a similar path, setting up marketing boards as purchasing and selling 
intermediaries to protect their farmers from the vagaries of world market prices and the 
perceived exploitation by middlemen traders, a range of state controlled industries to 
process raw material, and more. 
 
Agencies like the World Bank, surprising though it may seem today, were in full 
support of such strategies. After all, Keynes designed the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development as a publicly owned entity to mediate between sources of 
finance (essentially, Wall Street), and European and Japanese infrastructure reconstruction. 
As attention shifted from reconstruction of Europe and Japan to the development of 
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the statist thrust remained. The World Bank 
financed many of the state enterprises that were producing behind import barriers in 
countries that emerged from successive waves of the post-war decolonization. Economic 
growth rates in Asia, Africa and Latin America were creditable by historical standards and, 
in countries like Brazil, remarkably high. 
 
The statist approach of the 1940s and 1950s was not without its critics—for its 
insensitivity to distributional issues, that is. The emphasis on heavy industry, whatever its 
impact on investment and on economic growth, was argued to be not helping the poor. In 
Brazil, the high growth period of the 1960s was accompanied by increasing inequality with 
the result that the impact on poverty was dissipated. In India, after the first two five year 
plans, covering 1951-56 and 1956-61, the third Five Year Plan (1961-66) began a period of 
explicit focus on poverty and the poor, with special attention being paid to agriculture, 
where the bulk of the poor worked. This emphasis continued in the fourth and fifth five 
year plans. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s slogan for the election of the early 1970s was 
“Garibi Hatao” (“End Poverty”). 
 
The international agencies were undergoing a similar transformation. The President 
of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, made his famous Nairobi speech in 1973, in which 
he spoke of "absolute poverty: a condition of life so degraded by disease, illiteracy, 
malnutrition and squalor as to deny its victims basic human necessities and a condition of 
life so common as to be the lot of some 40% of the peoples of the developing countries." 
He spoke of the rural poor, and defined rural development as a development goal. The ILO 
introduced the “basic needs” approach to development, and the “informal sector” as a key 
component of urban poverty. The World Bank’s Chief Economist, Hollis Chenery, 
published a volume called “Redistribution with Growth” (Chenery, 1974). 
 
The statist and import-substitution approach to development continued, however. 
During the fourth Five Year Plan in India, major national banks were nationalized. Latin 
America and Africa continued on their route of import substitution and nationalization 
strategies. But in the 1960s and 70s there emerged a story of development success which 
was to have a major impact on the development discourse. This was the “growth with 
                                                 
5 The influence of Fabian Socialism on Indian Prime Minister Nehru is well documented. His technical 
advisers were similarly oriented. To take one example, V.K.R.V. Rao had been a student of Keynes at 
Cambridge. 
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equity” experienced by the East Asian economies of South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. In 
these economies, income poverty had fallen significantly in the wake of historically high 
growth rates. There was consensus on the distributional side of the story—land reform in 
South Korea and Taiwan (imposed by Americans after the war), early spread of basic 
education, and growth of demand for unskilled labor in labor intensive export industries. 
 
It is the last of these outcomes that set in train the calls for trade liberalization 
which framed the development debate for the next two decades, and continue to do so 
today. That the East Asian economies had rising unskilled wages, that there was increasing 
employment in light industries manufacturing for exports, is agreed. But how exactly this 
came about, and its policy implications for other countries, is disputed. In particular, the 
importance of sequencing, of starting with protection and then gradually opening up, is 
much debated. At the same time the role of the financial sector, the extent to which it was 
regulated and directed to provide credit for key industries, is also an exhibit in clash of 
evidence on whether the “East Asia miracle” owes its emergence to policies at the “left” 
end of the spectrum or the “right” end of the spectrum discussed earlier. 
 
The 1970s were thus a decade of considerable rethinking of the economic 
development paradigm that had dominated the previous three decades. The macro level 
policies of trade protection and heavy state intervention in industry was criticized from the 
“left” for not giving distribution sufficient attention, and from the “right” for giving 
insufficient attention to trade and to the private sector. 
 
There things stood till the 1980s, which as I said at the start, was a hell of a decade. 
There was a swing away from postwar Keynesianism in Europe and North America, which 
had its own political economic logic. As the first OPEC oil shock of 1973 and then the 
second OPEC oil shock of 1979 worked their way through the system they led to severe 
balance of payments difficulties for non-oil exporting countries in Latin America, Asia and 
Africa. The US Federal Reserve, under Paul Volcker, raised interest rates dramatically to 
squeeze inflation out of the system in the US, with a resultant rise in the dollar. But this led 
to unsustainable debt repayment burdens (mostly dollar denominated) for many countries 
in Latin America, with a debt crisis and a generalized macroeconomic crisis in those 
countries and several others with heavy exposure to external debt. 
 
The macroeconomic crises of developing countries had an inextricable external 
dimension. The immediate crisis was one of lack of foreign exchange to service debts and 
purchase imports. In this context, trade liberalization was advanced as a solution to 
generate foreign exchange through exports. The crisis arguments meshed with longer term 
arguments on the efficacy of inward looking versus outward oriented development 
strategies. Where necessary, the case was bolstered further by the argument that such a 
strategy would increase demand for unskilled labor and hence unskilled wages, as had 
happened in East Asia. But the main thrust of the argument was that integration into the 
global economy was the best strategy for economic growth, and growth was the best route 
to poverty reduction. 
 
 7
Then came 1989, the fall of the Berlin wall, and the triumphalism of “the end of 
history”. This was the culmination of the general pressure for reducing the role of the state 
in the economy that had started in the 1970s in Europe and North America and saw its 
apogee in the Reagan-Thatcher-Kohl era. With the collapse of the communist statist system 
(the writing was on the wall in the early 1980s in any event), the lessons for developing 
countries also seemed clear. Just as the Soviet successes of the 1930s, 40s and 50s had 
inspired the first two Indian Five Year plans, and had continued to influence the next three, 
the sixth and seventh Five Year plans (1980-85 and 1985-89) began the process of 
economic liberalization. Key price controls were abolished. After a period of political 
instability, in 1991 major external liberalization measures were announced, and the gradual 
opening of the Indian economy was undertaken during the eighth Five Year plan period 
(1992-97).  
 
In Africa, external liberalization was undertaken, the most obvious indicator of 
which was the freeing of the exchange rate from controls and rationing in most of Eastern 
and Southern Africa, and gradual removal of quantitative trade restrictions and lowering of 
tariffs. In Latin America, similar external sector liberalizations were undertaken. In all 
countries, the debt burden meant significant austerity in public sector budgets as balance 
was sought between revenue and expenditure. In the formerly communist transition 
economies of Eastern Europe, the early 1990s saw regimes of “shock therapy” as 
economies were opened up and privatized “at a stroke.” 
 
The 1980s and 1990s also saw the opening up and integration of China into the 
global economy (formally, the Chinese process began in 1978). While politically 
communist, China increasingly took on the characteristics of a market economy, with 
peasants being allowed to keep what they produced, inward foreign investment, and 
spectacular increases in exports, investment and economic growth. At least 200 million 
Chinese have been lifted out of income poverty since the opening up began in 1978, 
perhaps the most dramatic reduction in poverty in history. 
 
Thus during the 1980s and 1990s the economic development discourse took a 
distinct turn away from the previous consensus among the economic policy making elite. 
Williamson (1990) specifies that the “Washington” of the Washington consensus is “both 
the political Washington of Congress and senior members of the administration and the 
technocratic Washington of the international financial institutions, the economic agencies 
of the US government, the Federal Reserve Board, and the think tanks.” In Kanbur (2001) I 
identify what I call a “Ministry of Finance tendency”: 
 
“In this group would obviously be some who worked in finance ministries in the North, and in the 
South. It would also include many economic analysts, economic policy managers and operational managers in 
the IFI’s and the Regional Multilateral Banks. A key constituent would be the financial press, particularly in 
the North but also in the South. Finally, one would include many, though not all, academic economists trained 
in the Anglo-Saxon tradition.” 
 
Obviously, these are tendencies and not hard and fast classifications. “There are 
clearly people who work in the IFIs who are not “Finance Ministry types”, just as there are 
academic economists trained in the Anglo-Saxon tradition who would, for example, caution 
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strongly on capital account liberalization” (Kanbur, 2001). But they are recognizable, I 
think, as a constituency that held views at the “right” end of the policy spectrum identified 
earlier. In this sense the 1980s and 1990s saw a swing towards this constituency—although 
it should be emphasized that these very same constituencies (not necessarily the same 
individuals) were at the other end of the spectrum in an earlier era. 
 
But the challenges to the new consensus were not slow in appearing, and many of 
them were in any case embedded in the previous discourse. As I said at the start of Kanbur 
(2001): “The end of history lasted for such a short time.” I will argue that these challenges 
in turn have led to a modification of the center of gravity of the consensus along the 
spectrum from “right” to “left.” A number of outcomes in the 1980s and 1990s contributed 
to the challenges, and to the challenges being effective. I will pick five examples to 
illustrate.  
 
First, the East Asia crisis of 1997 was a major blow to those who were arguing for 
rapid capital account opening to move further to the “right” along the spectrum. The debate 
on this among economists was interesting because they were split. It is not surprising that 
those who were generally skeptical of a strong move to the “right”, such as Stiglitz (2002) 
would oppose capital account liberalization. What might surprise some is that economists 
like Jagdish Bhagwati, a staunch supporter of trade liberalization and of foreign direct 
investment, was equally strongly against the hasty liberalization of financial flows that was 
advocated, encouraged and sometimes imposed in the 1980s and 1990s. Bhagwati’s 
position is worth quoting at length as an antidote to the simplistic classifications one 
sometimes finds of “pro” or “anti” free market positions. 
 
“Starting in Thailand in the summer of 1997, the Asian financial crisis swept through Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and South Korea, turning the region’s economic miracle into a debacle….The crisis, precipitated by 
panic-fueled outflows of capital, was a product of hasty and imprudent financial liberalization, almost always 
under foreign pressure, allowing free international flows of short-term capital without adequate attention to 
the potentially potent downside of such globalization. There has been no shortage of excuses and strained 
explanations scapegoating the victims, suggesting they committed hara-kiri instead of being slaughtered. It is 
hard not to conclude that the motivation underlying these specious explanations is a desire to continue to 
maintain ideological positions in favor of a policy of free capital flows or to escape responsibility for playing 
a central role in pushing for what one might aptly call gung-ho international financial capitalism.” (Bhagwati, 
2004, pp199-200) 
 
This from a man who also wrote, in the same book:  
 
“In short, I argue that the notion that globalization needs a human face—a staple of popular rhetoric 
that has become a dangerous cliché--is wrong, It raises a false alarm. Globalization has a human face, but we 
can make that face yet more agreeable.” (Bhagwati, 2004, p x) 
 
In any event, the East Asia crisis led to a reconsideration of financial flows 
liberalization, with the result that even the IMF is now more cautious in advocating this 
move.6
 
                                                 
6 See for example the paper by two former senior IMF officials, Prasad and Rajan (2008), which reflects 
current thinking in the IMF. 
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The second set of “facts on the ground” which posed a challenge to the emerging 
consensus on economic policy for development in the 1990s was the disastrous experience 
of most transition economies of Eastern Europe. It was suggested humorously by some that 
the “shock therapy” of rapid privatization and quick integration into the world economy 
was “more shock than therapy.” These economies underwent exactly the opposite of the 
East Asian miracle of the 1960s and 1970s—instead of growth with equity they had 
economic decline with increasing inequality. This outcome was attributed, by many 
economists, like Stiglitz (2002), and by the populations of these countries, to an overly 
hasty and radical move from a statist past to a market oriented future without regulatory 
safeguards and without safety nets. These economies are only now recovering from 
economic decline, some two decades after the transition began, and the inequalities 
introduced into the system by rapid privatization are now part of the economic and political 
structure of countries like Russia. 
 
Third, more generally, many countries in Africa and Latin America which followed 
the prescriptions of greater trade openness and greater reliance on markets did not reap the 
growth benefits that were touted for them. Even those which grew, like Ghana, found the 
results to be short of what had been promised. But many in Latin America in particular had 
slow growth rates, leading to entire decades being described as “lost.”7
 
Fourth, the rapid growth of India and China, and the recognition that these countries 
have not followed the neo-liberal prescriptions a l’outrance, has influenced the discourse. 
Both countries have adopted a more outward oriented development strategy than in the 
past—China since the 1980s, India since the 1990s. But both countries maintained controls 
on capital flows, and as a result escaped the repercussions of the East Asian crisis. China 
has deployed its internal financial system to maintaining an undervalued exchange rate, a 
key reason for its dramatic export performance. And both countries have continued to use 
domestic redistribution to address rising inequality. 
 
The fifth set of outcomes is in fact the sharp increases in inequality within rapidly 
growing countries over the past twenty years. Whether it is China, India, Bangladesh, 
Vietnam, Russia, Ghana, South Africa, Mexico, etc., and in contrast to the East Asian 
experience of the 1960s and 1970s, rapid growth seems to be accompanied by rising 
inequality. This has been matched by rising inequality within OECD countries, as the post-
war phase of the “the great compression” of skilled-unskilled wage differentials ended in 
the 1980s and economic returns to skills and education began to increase dramatically. For 
developing countries, even when official poverty statistics have come down because of 
rapid growth, distributional concerns persist in society and policy makers. In India in 2004, 
a party with the slogan “India Shining” was defeated by a party with the slogan “The 
Common Man”, leading, for example, to the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 
which introduced a massive public works scheme designed to address low incomes in rural 
areas. In South Africa, the post-apartheid euphoria has been dampened by rising 
inequalities, including within the black population. In Latin America, a wave of populist 
leaders has been elected on the strength of concerns about rising inequality and 
vulnerability. In China, even if there is no formal western style democracy, and even with a 
                                                 
7 See for example Easterly (2001) 
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brilliant performance on growth and poverty reduction, policy makers are worried about 
growing disparities between people and between regions. They have begun to intensify 
redistributive measures.8
 
These and other developments in the last two decades, particularly in the last 
decade, have led to considerable rethinking in the economic development discourse. Does 
this mean there is a new consensus? The next section takes up that story. 
 
 
4. A New Consensus?  
 
The challenges to the “Washington Consensus”—to what it became, if not to what 
it was—have come in the journal discourse of academia, in the urgency of policy settings, 
in the heat of civil society discourse, and in tear gas on the streets from Cochabamba to 
Seattle. The initial reaction to the challenges was one of circling the wagons—I discussed 
the “negotiating mindset” in Section 2. The US Treasury took strong positions on the 
benefits of global integration and private markets, and was a major player in influencing 
the IMF to go for capital account liberalization in the early 1990s.9 It further pushed rapid 
privatization in Eastern Europe, and trade liberalization in developing countries of Africa 
and Asia and Latin America. Particularly at the end of the 1990s, with street battles in 
Seattle and the sieges of the Annual Meetings of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, positions were sharply divided between what I have called the “Ministry 
of Finance tendency” and the “Civil Society tendency”10 It did not seem as though there 
could be any sort of consensus on economic policy, poverty and distribution.11
 
And yet, as the 1990s and the 2000s wore on, and as the “facts on the ground” 
began to accumulate as discussed in the previous sections, a discernible shift did begin to 
take place in the economic development discourse. I have already mentioned the 
turnaround in the IMF’s (and the US Treasury’s) position on capital account liberalization. 
More recently have come reassessments of their positions on trade liberalization by 
economists like Lawrence Summers, who were in the forefront of arguing for and pushing 
for rapid global integration. Rising inequality in the US and Europe has tempered their zeal 
and seems to have occasioned a broader rethink: 
 
“Continuing to assert that protection is bad and that globalization is inevitable and therefore 
governments should do more to help the losers while at the same time ignoring the challenge that 
globalization poses to progressive taxation and other policies to assure that economic progress is widely 
shared is I believe a prescription for failure. True friends of global integration and of the developing world 
                                                 
8 These issues are discussed in Kanbur (2007). 
9 The institutional story of the time is well documented in Blustein (2001, 2005) 
10 “This group would obviously include analysts and advocates in the full range of advocacy and operational 
NGO’s. There would also be people who worked in some of the UN specialized agencies, in aid ministries in 
the North and social sector ministries in the South. Amongst academics, non-economists would tend to fall 
into this group.” (Kanbur, 2001). 
11 I had a small part in the controversies of the time, when I resigned as the Director of the World Bank’s 
World Development Report on Poverty in May of 2000 and returned to Cornell. I wrote about the analytical 
dimensions of the disputes in Kanbur (2001). 
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will work to design more ways to insure that a more integrated and prosperous global economy is one from 
which all will benefit.” Summers (2008) 
 
Such statements have been characterized as “recantation”. In the article to which 
Summers (2008) is a response, Kapur, Mehta and Subramanian (2008) note the following: 
 
“The problem Mr. Summers identifies, the hyper-mobility of capital, was an outcome that he and the 
US actively promoted. Attracting foreign capital was one of the raisons d’être of the Washington Consensus-
based reforms. Developing countries were forced to change their intellectual property laws. At the US 
Treasury, Mr. Summers was a leading proponent of capital account liberalisation by developing countries. 
Having swallowed those bitter pills of intellectual property protection and capital mobility as a necessary 
price for a better future, developing countries are now told that those medicines cause problems that need 
more – in this case protectionist – medication.” 
 
In any event, there seems to be considerable repositioning going on in the economic 
policy discourse. As David Wessel (2007) of the Wall Street Journal notes: 
 
“A new argument is emerging among the pro-globalization crowd in the U.S., the folks who see 
continued globalization and trade as vital to the country's prosperity: Tax the rich more heavily to thwart an 
economically crippling political backlash against trade prompted by workers who see themselves -- with 
some justification -- as losers from globalization.”  
 
The above arguments by Summers focus on trade and inequality in the US and in 
rich countries. But a similar rethink is underway on policy for developing countries, 
especially in light of the sharp increases in inequality that have been seen there in the past 
two decades. On trade liberalization, more nuanced views on its impact on growth (Rodrik, 
2007), and on distribution (Harrison, 2007) have begun to be heard more loudly. An 
altogether more nuanced view on development policy, based on the lessons of the 1990s, is 
presented in a recent report from the World Bank (2005). In fact, Dani Rodrik (2008b) best 
articulates the current state of the discourse on economic development more generally 
when he renders the following verdict on the globalization debate: 
“There was a time when global elites could comfort themselves with the thought that opposition to 
the world trading regime consisted of violent anarchists, self-serving protectionists, trade unionists, and 
ignorant, if idealistic youth. Meanwhile, they regarded themselves as the true progressives, because they 
understood that safeguarding and advancing globalization was the best remedy against poverty and 
insecurity.…But that self-assured attitude has all but disappeared, replaced by doubts, questions, and 
skepticism. Gone also are the violent street protests and mass movements against globalization. What makes 
news nowadays is the growing list of mainstream economists who are questioning globalization’s supposedly 
unmitigated virtues….While these worries hardly amount to the full frontal attack mounted by the likes of 
Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel-prize winning economist, they still constitute a remarkable turnaround in the 
intellectual climate. Moreover, even those who have not lost heart often disagree vehemently about the 
direction in which they would like to see globalization go”.  
On the distributional front, direct interventions to mitigate the worst outcomes of 
poverty and rising inequality, through Conditional Cash Transfers, have exploded in Latin 
America, starting with Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades program. Now most countries 
have such programs, including for example Brazil’s Bolsa Familia.12 The broad concern 
with distributional outcomes is reflected in the adoption of the Millennium Development 
                                                 
12 I discuss these and other emerging aspects in the poverty and distribution discourse in Kanbur (2008). 
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Goals by the world development community in 2000. These include reduction of income 
poverty, but other goals such as reducing infant mortality, improving education for the 
poorest, and so on.13 The broad objective of human development had been advocated by 
the UNDPs Human Development Reports since the 1990s—they have become more 
prominent, and in terms of exposure now are on par with the World Bank’s World 
Development Reports. 
 
Perhaps the best example of the rethink that is underway in economic intellectual 
and policy circles is evidenced by the report of the Growth Commission (Commission on 
Growth and Development, 2008). This is a Commission headed by Nobel Prize winning 
economist Michael Spence, with the other academic on it being another Nobel Prize 
winning economist, Robert Solow, the father of the modern theory of economic growth. All 
of the other 19 names on the Commission are non-academics, most of them current or 
former policy makers. The full membership of the Commission is given in Box 2. I have 
taken the unusual step of naming all the Commissioners because who they are is central to 
my argument. As a collectivity this is surely as close as one gets to what I have called the 
“Ministry of Finance tendency” (Kanbur 2001), or what Williamson (1990) meant by the 
“Washington” of the Washington consensus (suitably extended to include elite decision 
makers in developing countries). 
 
 
Box 2 
 
Membership of the Growth Commission 
 
Montek Ahluwalia, Deputy Chairman of the Panning Commission of India; 
Edmar Bacha, former President of the National Development Bank of Brazil; Boediono, 
Governor of the Central Bank of Indonesia; Lord John Browne, former CEO of British 
Petroleum; Kemal Dervis, former Finance Minister of Turkey and current Administrator 
of the United Nations Development Program; Alejandro Foxley, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Chile; Goh Chok Ton; Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore; 
Hand Duck-soo, former Prime Minister of South Korea; Danuta Hubner, 
Commissioner for Regional Policy, European Commission, Poland; Carin Jamtin, 
former Minister for International Development, Sweden; Pedro-Pablo Kuczyniski, 
Former Prime Minister of Peru; Danny Leipziger, Vice President of the World Bank;  
Trevor Manuel, Finance Minister of South Africa; Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, former 
Finance Minister of Nigeria and now Managing Director of the World Bank; Mahmoud 
Mohieldin, Minister of Investment of Egypt; Robert Rubin, former Treasury Secretary 
of the USA; Robert Solow, Nobel Laureate in Economics; Michael Spence, Nobel 
Laureate in Economics; Dwight Venner, Governor of the Easter Caribbean Central 
Bank; Ernesto Zedillo, former President of Mexico; and Zhou Xiaouchuan, Governor 
of the Central Bank of China. 
 
 
  
                                                 
13 For the MDG report, see United Nations (2007). 
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Well, what is the Commission consensus, in light of the debates and discussion I 
have reviewed in this section and the last? I give a flavor of the Commission’s report by 
quoting at length from the Overview in Box 3—perforce selectively but I hope 
representatively. Perhaps mindful of the possible criticism that the stance taken by the 
Commission might be viewed as being too general, the Commission do get specific and 
present a list of what they call “bad ideas” for development policy, where “the 
overwhelming weight of evidence suggests that such policies involve large costs,” but they 
do hasten to add that these are suggestions which should be discussed in specific contexts. 
These “bad ideas” are reproduced in Box 4.  
 
Box 3 
 
Growth Commission Overview 
 
“Growth is not an end in itself. But it makes it possible to achieve other important objectives of 
individuals and societies. It can spare people en masse from poverty and drudgery. Nothing else ever has. It 
also creates the resources to support health care, education, and the other Millennium Development Goals 
to which the world has committed itself. In short, we take the view that growth is a necessary, if not 
sufficient, condition for broader development, enlarging the scope for individuals to be productive and 
creative.” (p 1) 
“The report …does not provide a formula for policy makers to apply—no generic formula exists. 
Each country has specific characteristics and historical experiences that must be reflected in its growth 
strategy. But the report does offer a framework that should help policy makers create a growth strategy of 
their own. “ (p 2) 
“Growth of 7 percent a year, sustained over 25 years, was unheard of before the latter half of the 
20th century. It is possible only because the world economy is now more open and integrated…. [G]rowth 
strategies that rely exclusively on domestic demand eventually reach their limits. The home market is 
usually too small to sustain growth for long, and it does not give an economy the same freedom to 
specialize in whatever it is best at producing. (p 2) 
“Reforms may be admirable and represent major achievements, but if growth does not accelerate, 
or if large numbers of people do not feel any improvement in their circumstances, then there is more work 
to do. Relying on markets to allocate resources efficiently is clearly necessary (there is no known, effective 
substitute), but that is not the same thing as letting some combination of markets and a menu of reforms 
determine outcomes.” (pp 3-4) 
“Wedded to the goal of high growth, governments should be pragmatic in their pursuit of it.  
Orthodoxies apply only so far…. At this stage, our models or predictive devices are, in important respects, 
incomplete…. It is, therefore, prudent for governments to pursue an experimental approach to the 
implementation of economic policy…. Governments should sometimes proceed step by step, avoiding 
sudden shifts in policy where the potential risks outweigh the benefits. (p3) 
“In recent decades governments were advised to “stabilize, privatize and liberalize.” There is merit 
in what lies behind this injunction—governments should not try to do too much, replacing markets or 
closing the economy off from the rest of the world. But we believe this prescription defines the role of 
government too narrowly. Just because governments are sometimes clumsy and sometimes errant, does not 
mean they should be written out of the script. On the contrary, as the economy grows and develops, active, 
pragmatic governments have crucial roles to play. (p4).” 
“The Commission strongly believes that growth strategies cannot succeed without a commitment 
to equality of opportunity, giving everyone a fair chance to enjoy the fruits of growth. But equal 
opportunities are no guarantee of equal outcomes. Indeed, in the early stages of growth, there is a natural 
tendency for income gaps to widen. Governments should seek to contain this inequality, the Commission 
believes, at the bottom and top ends of the income spectrum. Otherwise, the economy’s progress may be 
jeopardized by divisive politics, protest, and even violent conflict. Again, if the ethical case does not 
persuade, the pragmatic one should.” (p7) 
Commission on Growth and Development (2008) 
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Box 4 
 
“Bad Ideas” for Development Policy and Intervention 
 
“• Subsidizing energy except for very limited subsidies targeted at highly vulnerable sections 
of the population. 
• Dealing with joblessness by relying on the civil service as an “employer of last resort.” This 
is distinct from public-works programs, such as rural employment schemes, which can provide a 
valuable social safety net. 
• Reducing fiscal deficits, because of short term macroeconomic compulsions, by cutting 
expenditure on infrastructure investment (or other public spending that yields large social returns in 
the long run).  
• Providing open-ended protection of specific sectors, industries, firms, and jobs from 
competition. Where support is necessary, it should be for a limited period, with a clear strategy for 
moving to a self-supporting structure.  
• Imposing price controls to stem inflation, which is much better handled through other 
macroeconomic policies.  
• Banning exports for long periods of time to keep domestic prices low for consumers at the 
expense of producers. 
• Resisting urbanization and as a consequence underinvesting in urban infrastructure. 
• Ignoring environmental issues in the early stages of growth on the grounds that they are an 
“unaffordable luxury.” 
• Measuring educational progress solely by the construction of school infrastructure or even 
by higher enrollments, instead of focusing on the extent of learning and quality of education.  
• Underpaying civil servants (including teachers) relative to what the market would provide 
for comparable skills and combining this with promotion by seniority instead of evolving credible 
methods of measuring performance of civil servants and rewarding it.  
• Poor regulation of the banking system combined with excessive direct control and 
interference. In general, this prevents the development of an efficient system of financial 
intermediation that has higher costs in terms of productivity. 
• Allowing the exchange rate to appreciate excessively before the economy is ready for the 
transition towards higher-productivity industry.” (pp 68-69) 
 
Commission on Growth and Development (2008)
 
  
I believe that the Growth Commission report is a remarkable document, not only 
because it is the consensus of a group of people who represent, if any group could so 
represent, the policy making elite on economic development. It is also remarkable because 
it reflects the debates and discussions of the past two decades and earlier, and an evolution 
in stance as a result of those debates. It is clearly more market and trade oriented than the 
consensus of the 1950s, 60s and 70s. In some ways it is fully consistent with the shift away 
from that consensus that came about in the 1980s. The Growth Commission is clear that 
market orientation should play a central role, and that sustained growth cannot be attained 
without an outward orientation. But in many other ways it is a departure from the 
consensus of the 1980s, from the Washington Consensus if you will.14 Here are no 
certainties of a “one size fits all” stance, and of the negotiating mindset. There is openness 
                                                 
14 What the Washington Consensus became rather than what it started off as with Williamson (1990)—notice 
the similarities between some aspects of Box 1 and Boxes 3 and 4. 
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to country specificities. Distributional concerns are center-stage. A broader perspective on 
development—including education, health, environment—is adopted. All this is music to 
my ears, since it is what I have been arguing for (Kanbur, 1999, 2001, for example).15 But 
Dani Rodrik (2008a) sums it up best: 
 
“The Spence report represents a watershed for development policy – as much for what it says as for 
what it leaves out. Gone are confident assertions about the virtues of liberalization, deregulation, 
privatization, and free markets. Also gone are the cookie cutter policy recommendations unaffected by 
contextual differences. Instead, the Spence report adopts an approach that recognizes the limits of what we 
know, emphasizes pragmatism and gradualism, and encourages governments to be experimental…. The 
Spence report reflects a broader intellectual shift within the development profession, a shift that encompasses 
not just growth strategies but also health, education, and other social policies. …It is to Spence’s credit that 
the report manages to avoid both market fundamentalism and institutional fundamentalism. Rather than 
offering facile answers such as “just let markets work” or “just get governance right,” it rightly emphasizes 
that each country must devise its own mix of remedies. Foreign economists and aid agencies can supply some 
of the ingredients, but only the country itself can provide the recipe…. If there is a new Washington 
consensus, it is that the rulebook must be written at home, not in Washington.” 
 
I would like to end this section with a brief discussion of the implications of the 
global financial crisis of late 2008 for the new consensus. Starting with the failure of 
Lehman Brothers in September, 2008, a crisis gripped the world’s financial system, and 
spread to the real economy with alarming speed. In November the G20 group of countries 
had a meeting of heads of state, which is seen as the start of a potential redesign of the 
global financial architecture.16 However, the seeds of this crisis were sown in the 1990s 
and the early 2000s, in the wave of financial sector derregulations that were enacted in the 
wake of the triumphalism of “the end of history”. I have already noted how the global 
financial crisis of the late 1990s led to a reconsideration of the capital account 
liberalization. But internal deregulation proceeded apace during this time as well, leading 
to an explosion in derivatives trading, lightly supervised and regulated. In the US these 
changes happened under a Democratic administration, and are often labeled “Rubinomics”, 
after Robert Rubin, which encompasses “balanced budgets, free trade and financial 
deregulation.”17
 
I have discussed how rising inequality has caused a reconsideration of unfettered 
free trade among some proponents of the Washington Consensus of the 1990s, and how 
these repositionings have fed into an emerging new consensus reflected in the Growth 
Commission report. The current global crisis has led to a questioning of the other two 
tenets—balanced budgets and internal financial deregulation. The massive stimulus 
packages being recommended by the fiscal conservatives of yesteryear are a testament to 
the power not so much of ideas but of “facts on the ground” to change minds and hearts. 
And the fierce financial deregulators of the 1990s have now turned into equally ardent 
supporters of (re) regulation.18
 
                                                 
15 I should also say that I wrote a background paper for the Commission on the importance of distributional 
concerns (Kanbur, 2007).  
16 See The White House (2008) 
17 Calmes (2008) 
18 See Leonhardt (2008). 
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The current crisis can only strengthen the stand taken by the Growth Commission in 
some areas against the Washington Consensus. A central issue remains, however. If it is 
now recognized that each country must be allowed the space to regulate its financial sector, 
to address emerging inequalities, and to have fiscal expansion in the face of output slumps, 
all of which are consistent with the Growth Commission’s views on country specificities, 
we must also face up to what this means for the free flow of finance capital between 
countries. Such free flow undermines policy independence, and can lead to a race to the 
bottom as countries try to keep volatile portfolio capital. Two remedies suggest 
themselevs—greater international coordination of policies or a greater degree of capital 
control. Even if the later were only a small part of the package, it will have been quite an 
eventful journey, back to a point where capital controls are part of the legitimate discourse 
of international policy! 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have tried to place the Washington consensus in the context of 
evolution of the economic development discourse. This evolution has been argued to be 
dialectical in nature. The consensus of the 1980s was a reaction to the well established 
consensus of the previous three decades. However, challenges to the Washington consensus 
emerged no sooner than it had been formulated, in the realm of ideas (which drew on 
elements of the earlier consensus) and from outcomes on the ground. As a result, the strong 
positions taken up by the economic development policy making elite had to be and were 
modified. The process has been ongoing, but the new consensus is perhaps best captured by 
the recent report of the Commission on Growth and Development (2008). The global 
financial crisis of late 2008 can only strengthen the move towards this new consensus, and 
beyond. The new consensus keeps key elements of the shift away from the post-second-
world-war consensus, but restores other elements, and adds new ingredients of its own. As 
a result, it is eclectic and not as sharp and as focused as the orthodoxy of the 1980s. To 
some, this is a recipe for confusion, an “anything goes” scenario with lack of clarity on 
specific policy advice.19 But to me it is the basis for a deeper discussion of where exactly 
along the policy spectrum, along each dimension, a country should aim for in order to 
achieve the long run objective of economic development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Indeed the evolving new set of recommended policies and interventions has sometimes been referred to as 
“Washington Confusion.” (Naim, 1999, Rodrik, 2006)) 
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